I. Introduction
Dynamic models of labour supply predict a positive correlation between transitory wage changes and work hours, i.e. the intertemporal wage elasticity is determined by the substitution effect alone (Lucas and Rapping, 1969) . Empirical estimates of life cycle models of labour supply often use individual panel data and find elasticities to be small (Card, 1994) . However, relating annual changes in hours worked to annual changes in average hourly earnings are likely to be biased and require auxiliary assumptions relating to the persistence of wage shocks, formation of wage expectations, and it can be questioned whether annual wage changes are fully anticipated and purely transitory. In addition, it is a fact that workers rarely set their work hours (Dickens and Lundberg, 1993) .
By studying workers that experience transitory wage changes and set their own hours, the above mentioned problems are reduced. Camerer et al. (1997) analysed three data sets of New York cab drivers and found significant and substantial negative elasticities, particularly for a group of inexperienced drivers. According to the authors these drivers made labour supply decisions 1 day at the time instead of substituting labour and leisure over several days, and set a daily income target and quit when reaching this target. The result is not unchallenged, and Oettinger (1999) held that overlooking the endogeneity of wage changes leads to severely downward biased elasticity estimates, which he demonstrated for stadium vendors at baseball games. Goette et al. (2004) also provided support for reference dependence preferences, while Farber (2005) , also studying New York cab drivers, found that daily wages are not stable within days, and rejected an important role for reference-dependent preferences (Farber, 2008) . Fehr and Goette (2007) found results in line with both perspectives, where subjects did supply more labour with an expected transitory wage increase, but a specific sub-group with loss-averse individuals, responded with negative elasticity of effort per hour. Hence, if the supply effect dominates elasticities will be positive, while a dominating effort intensity reduction effect would lead to negative elasticities.
In response to the conflicting findings in the literature Ko 00 szegi and Rabin (KR, 2006 ) developed a general theory of reference-dependent preferences that endogenizes reference targets based on the rational expectations of an outcome. By defining an individual's utility to depend on both a standard neo-classical consumption utility as well as on what they coin a gain-loss utility, they are able to combine the two theoretical strands in a general framework that allows to explain the predominant result of one or the other in specific economic circumstances. Crawford and Meng (2011) apply KR's (2006) model to re-examine the labour supply decisions of New York City cabdrivers and find support in favour of the reference-dependent model. Abeler et al. (2011) using an experiment also found support of referencedependent preferences.
In this article we use KR's (2006) theory of reference-dependent preferences, and in particular the assumption of both an income and an hours target, to explain our results of nonconstant wage elasticities for paua (abalone) divers in three distinct areas in southern New Zealand, from here on referred to as paua divers. Paua is managed by an Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) system enabling contract divers to decide when and where to fish during a fishing year within a given area. The divers receive a stable, flat price per kilogram after each catch throughout the season, but experience transitory wage changes due to prevailing underwater visibility conditions and spatial resource abundance, and they are free to set their own hours. This provides an ideal background to study the substitution effect in isolation of the income effect, and to determine whether paua divers are behaving according to the predictions of neo-classical theory or in fact reveal referencedependent preferences.
We establish a highly intermittent nature of the profession: the typical paua diver works approximately 3 to 4 months, spread more or less equally over the fishing year and undertakes two to three dives within each of those months, with no break to 3 days' break in between. He leaves in the morning (the profession is male dominated ), searches for good patches, dives and collects, and returns to port the same day to deliver the catch to licensed fish receivers. Hence, the neo-classical prediction is that these divers should work long hours during days when transitory catch per unit of effort levels are high while they should quit early during days when hourly wages are low. However, after controlling for weather conditions and seasonal effects on daily, monthly and annual basis, we find positive elasticities for low wages, zero elasticity at the average wage and negative elasticities for high wages across all three areas. Hence, on unexpected high-wage days divers quite relatively earlier against the neo-classical prediction but during unexpected low-wage days they quit earlier in line with the neo-classical prediction.
This apparent contradiction can be hosted within KR's (2006) model. The neo-classical model is a special case of KR's model where gain-loss utility is zero, but unlike previous attempts consumption utility is not assumed to be zero. The model makes a clear distinction between expected and unexpected wages and assumes that reference-dependence applies to both an income target and an hours target. These assumptions lead to the prediction that participation should increase when wages are expected to be high, reconciling the results of Oettinger (1999) and Camerer et al. (1997) . Further, unexpected high wages lead to workers reaching their income targets early and work short hours. For actual wages slightly below the expected level the hours target exerts a stronger influence on the decision to work pushing the wage elasticity close to zero. Our results indicate that it is the hours target which is most influential for our data, implying that it is the first-reached target for low wages but the second-reached target for high wages, unlike Crawford and Meng (2011) who found the second-reached target to be most influential on cab driver's decision to stop working throughout the wage interval. Both outcomes are possible within the KR theory, and our results provide support for the general notion that paua diving in isolated areas of New Zealand is very much a life choice occupation 1572
H. Eggert and V. Kahui that focuses on work to leisure trade-offs rather than short-term gains and losses in income.
II. Paua (Abalone) Fishery
In New Zealand abalone are commonly known by their indigenous Maori name, paua. Paua occupy rocky intertidal and sub-tidal habitats to a depth of 10-15 m and are gathered by hand while free diving in shallow waters, usually not more than 6 m off the coastline (Ministry of Fisheries, 2006) . They are known to form large aggregations on reefs, possibly to enhance fertilization, shelter or feeding. Divers tend to move amongst patches targeting large aggregations to maximize rent (McShane, 1995) . Movement of adult paua occurs over a very small spatial scale so that they are considered sedentary, but patches are loosely connected with each other so that local populations are aggregated into metapopulations. The fishing industry contributes NZ$1.7 billion 1 per annum to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of New Zealand with paua among its top 10 seafood export species. New Zealand is a key player in the international abalone market, where nearly all of the paua is sold processed (canned ) worth approximately NZ$50 million in 2006 (SeaFIC, 2006) .
On 1 October 1986, paua was among the first species to be adopted into New Zealand's rightsbased management response to dwindling inshore stocks, the ITQ system. Each year the government sets an overall Total Allowable Commercial Catch (TACC) for a specific species in a specific area, and the ITQs are well-defined rights to harvest a percentage share of this TACC. Owners can buy (sell) parts of their ITQ holdings in order to increase (reduce) their landings. The amount an owner is allowed to catch within the next fishing year is known as an Annual Catch Entitlement (ACE). To enhance flexibility of the system, ITQ owners may lease part of their ACE to other divers. The result is that anyone may enter the industry by buying ITQs or leasing ACE at any time but a maximum limit is enforced to inhibit monopolistic behaviour.
2 The underlying theory is that owners of ITQs may trade them freely in a competitive market generating price signals, which provide important information on the profitability and sustainability of the fishery.
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In New Zealand, the TACC for paua applies to eight distinct QMAs covering the whole of the country's coastline, i.e. each QMA has its own TACC. Once the TACC for a given QMA and a given year is determined, the tonnage equivalent of each ITQ percentage share is calculated and transferred to the ITQ owner on the first day of the fishing year. There is a minimum legal size for paua and divers are banned from using Scuba, but may use snorkelling gear. Figure 1 shows the boundaries of the three QMAs of interest to our study in the southern tip of New Zealand: PAU 5A (Fiordland ), PAU 5B (Stewart Island ) and PAU 5D (Southland/ Otago). Each QMA is further divided into fine-scale statistical areas for reporting purposes (not shown in Fig. 1 ).
Diving conditions in the southern tip of New Zealand are fairly homogeneous across the three areas shown in Fig. 1 and the average price of paua ACE traded has converged across the three QMAs to NZ$28 per kg in 2006. Becoming a paua diver is a fairly accessible profession for any physically healthy individual in New Zealand. The costs associated with securing ACE are high but participation costs in the fishery are relatively low (Ministry of Fisheries, 2007) . This has driven a change in recent years where few ITQ holders fish their own ACE but use contract divers instead.
III. Data and Econometric Method

Data
The empirical analysis uses data collected by the Ministry of Fisheries in New Zealand. Paua divers have to fill in a Paua Catch Effort and Landing Return (PCELR) after each 'diving trip', which typically refers to 1 day of diving activity (from here on referred to as dive occasion). The three datasets for PAU 5A, 5B and 5D stretch from 1 October 2001 to 30 September 2006, which covers five full fishing years. 4 Each of the three datasets contain uniquely computer generated keys to indicate the dive occasion, the individual ACE holder, the individual vessel, the individual diver and information on the date of the dive occasion, the statistical area, fishing duration (hours dived ), the amount of total catch per dive occasion (kg) and codes identifying the diving conditions at the time of fishing. 5 An additional dataset provides annual ACE entitlements of all active ACE holders in the relevant QMAs, which can be directly linked to the ACE holder keys. Note, given the nature of QMA-specific ACE allocations and distances, divers do not typically dive across QMAs within a given fishing year.
The occurrence of paua in shallow, inshore areas has engendered fairly homogenous boat sizes, less than 15 m long, with little capital being tied up in vessels, and travelling distances are relatively short (Ministry of Fisheries, 2007) .
Econometric method
The main goal of the empirical analysis is to explore the relationship between hours that divers choose to work each day and the average daily wage. Wage elasticity is defined as " ¼ dh t w t dw t h t where w t represents the wage rate and h t the hours of labour supply provided. Repeated use of the chain rule reveals that
Empirical studies use simple regressions of log hours on log wages, which we replicate but further analysis shows the significance of including both log wage squared and log wage cubed terms.
where i X i represents a set of dummy variables included to control for weather and seasonal effects, and lagged terms of log wage and log hours. Given Equations 1 and 2 it follows that the wage elasticity is not a single value evaluated at the sample mean but varies over the interval of observed wages according to
IV. Empirical Analysis
Descriptive statistics
In Table 1 we report summary statistics for divers across the three areas for the whole time period 2001-2002 to 2005-2006 . Pay incentives for divers are confidential and vary among ACE holders and from area to area, but the standard arrangement is that the harvest crew receive a stable, flat price per kilogram after each catch, which for 2009 was in the range NZ$6-10 per kg. It is common that the boat owner is another person, who sets the deal with the ACE holder, and then splits the proceeds 50-50 with the diver. 6 Hence, divers earned on average NZ$3.7 per kg (in constant 2006 NZ dollars) during each year of the periods studied. Based on these assumptions, we report catch per dive occasion in kg and average wage per hour in $NZ. Divers spent between 4 and 5 hours on average in the water, made NZ$105-167 per hour and earned gross revenues of NZ$248-836 per trip (latter value not shown in Table 1 ). The average annual diver income (gross revenue times the number of dive occasions per diver p.a.) is NZ$4464-12 775, which is substantially below the average annual pretax income of NZ$29 991 in agriculture, forestry and fishing and NZ$38 940 in manufacturing (Statistics New Zealand, 2009) . Our data confirm the general notion that divers have additional income from other , 5B and 5D in the southern tip of New Zealand 5 E ¼ excellent, very good visibility, lot less swell than usual for this area and time of year; G ¼ good, better than average, but not as good as excellent; A ¼ average visibility and the swell was average for this area and time of the year; P ¼ poor conditions, better than very poor, but not as good as average; V ¼ very poor visibility for this area and time of year, and there was a lot more swell than usual for this area and time of year; UNREPORTED ¼ diver did not supply the information. 6 Personal communication with Jeremy Cooper, CEO Paua Industry Council Ltd.
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H. Eggert and V. Kahui seasonal employment such as meat works, orchard work and other fishing/diving work. Given our figures, paua diving is likely to contribute roughly 30% of their annual income. Table 2 shows that the composition of ACE holders and divers within the three datasets is fairly homogeneous. The first and second row show that a total of 30-32 ACE holders are active between the fishing years 2001-2002 and 2005-2006 employing a total of 258-442 divers, confirming that a vast majority of divers are not ACE holders. On average, 88-140 divers are actively working in any given year. Each diver works on average for 1.2-1.3 ACE holders while ACE holders employ 9.9-17.4 divers on average.
The last three rows of Table 2 indicate the entry and exit pattern in each QMA. ACE holders are active in nearly all of the fishing years (3.3-3.7 years), while divers are only active for an average of 1.6-1.7 years. We find that about 70% of all divers in each data set exit the QMA within a year, indicating low barriers of entry and exit. When eliminating all those who exit the QMA after one fishing year, the remaining number of divers is reduced to 112, 77 and 113 in PAU 5A, 5B and 5D, respectively. The last row in Table 2 shows an increase in average number of active fishing years to 3.1-3.4. These experienced divers constitute roughly 30% in each sample but carry out more than 80% of the dives.
The first row in Table 3 shows that on average, each diver completes all of his or her dive occasions within 2.2-2.4 months within the fishing year (medians shown in parentheses), i.e. divers work on average for approximately 2 out of 12 months. However, for experienced divers (referred to as the 'experienced diver subset' in Table 3 ), the average annual number of diving months is 3.8-4.4. The remaining rows in Table 3 indicate that divers complete on average 2.3-3.0 (2) dive occasions within 1 month, with an average of 1.6-2.5 (0) days Reference-dependent behaviour of paua (abalone) divers in New Zealandelapsing between these occasions (the values for the experienced diver subset are very similar). Table 3 establishes the temporal work pattern of a typical core (experienced ) diver who works approximately 3 to 4 months within a fishing year and undertakes two to four dive occasions with up to 3 days' break within each of those months. No clear monthly work pattern emerges from the data. The mean (median) number of elapsed months of diving activity within a fishing year is approximately 3 (2) months across the three QMAs (not shown in Table 3 ). Thus, we observe a pattern of short term bursts of diving activity spread over the fishing year. This finding is consistent across the three datasets. At the maximum, divers carry out up to 35-71 days of diving per annum (see Table 1 ).
Figures 2-4 represent histograms of Catch Per Unit of Effort (CPUE) in intervals of 10 kg (measured as catch per hour), the hours spent diving in intervals of 1 hour and the number of dive occasions for each of the six weather codes (see footnote 6). The vertical axes represent the percentage frequency out of total observations to facilitate comparison between QMAs. Clearly, divers experience substantial variations in CPUE and work hours across the three QMAs. Figure 4 shows that most dive occasions occur during average weather conditions. Divers do not always go fishing by themselves. The datasets allow us to identify the occasions when divers share a vessel. Table 4 shows that each vessel carries two to three divers on average on each dive occasion, however, the mean absolute deviation from the average catch and hours dived for each vessel on each dive occasion is relatively low. This implies coordinated behaviour across divers on a vessel in terms of the number of hours dived and the amount of catch.
Wage elasticity
Starting with estimation of Equation 2 without the higher polynomial order of log wages, we obtain weak and mixed results regarding the wage elasticity in PAU 5A (0.2), PAU 5B (À0.1) and PAU 5D (0.05). These regressions were run including dummies representing weather conditions, the day of the week, the month of the year, and yearly dummies (not shown). In Table 5 , we report the regression results for the three QMAs for the model according to Equation 2. Regressions have also been run to account for clustered SEs within divers, robust estimators, diver-fixed effects, vessel-fixed effects, weather-fixed effects and area-fixed effects with no improvements on model fits or qualitative changes of the coefficients (not shown). We find a simple Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression to present the best fit of model as shown in Table 5 .
The coefficients on log wage, log wage squared and log wage cubed are highly significant for PAU 5A and 5B, while the best fit is achieved including only log wage and log wage squared for 5D. 7 Weather, day of the week, month of the year and yearly dummies are significant to various degree and do not reduce the fit of the model or alter the qualitative and quantitative values of log wage, log wage 2 and log wage 3 significantly when omitted. The adjusted R 2 values range from 0.117 to 0.173. In Figs 5-7 we show the estimated wage elasticities, using Equation 3, where the wage levels are calculated by the product of the CPUE and the average annual prices paid to a diver without boat and ACE (in NZ$2006) . For approximately 97% of the observations a clear pattern emerges. At low wage levels, divers work short hours in line with neo-classical predictions but at high wages divers work equally short hours.
For PAU 5A, the wage elasticity is positive with a maximum of 0.56, 0.10 in PAU 5B and 0.34 in PAU 5D. As the wage rate increases, the wage elasticity progressively declines until it turns negative and continues to about À1 for PAU 5A and 5B (the number of observations below À1 are 15 and 9, respectively) and to about À0.5 for PAU 5D.
Analysis
This section summarizes the results of empirical analysis by Eggert and Kahui (2011) , which should be referred to for more detailed explanations. Recent studies indicate potential differences in decision making comparing individuals and teams (Cooper PAU 5B
PAU 5D
Mean # months per annum 2.3 (1) 2.2 (1) 2.4 (1) Experienced diver subset 4.1 (4) 3.8 (3) 4.4 (4) Mean # dive occasions in month 2.3 (2) 3.0 (2) 2.4 (2) Experienced diver subset 2.7 (2) 3.9 (3) 2.8 (2) Mean # elapsed days in month 1.6 (0) 1.6 (0) 2.5 (0) Experienced diver subset 1.7 (0) 1.6 (0) 2.5 (0)
Note: *Median values are shown in parentheses.
7 Including log wage cubed in the estimations for PAU 5D renders all wage terms insignificant and reduces the fit of the model.
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Reference-dependent behaviour of paua (abalone) divers in New Zealand 1577 and Kagel, 2005; Sutter, 2007) . We tested, but found no marked difference in the behaviour of divers sharing a vessel and divers operating alone. Could capacity constraints drive the observed negative labour supply at a high wage rate? Analysis indicates that the absolute maximum vessel capacity is rarely reached and that capacity constraints hardly drive our estimation results. Our model is based on the assumption that average earnings are equal to marginal earnings. Two fishery independent surveys indicate that the common size and frequency of paua patches lead to homogeneous working conditions once suitable habitat is located, i.e. average wages may approximate marginal wages (Ministry of Fisheries, 2000 Fisheries, , 2004 . Note, our data on fishing duration (hours dived ) relate to the time spent in the water.
Does physical exhaustion, the fatigue effect, constrain the physical amount divers are able to harvest and thus influence the number of hours worked? We find that 75% of the observations are equal or less than 6-7 hours, but a small percentage of divers do the maximum number of 8-10 hours despite earning a very high wage. While there may be confounding factors it provides indirect support that divers may harvest large quantity and work long hours.
Furthermore, we investigate correlation coefficients of log hours dived on successive dive occasion (i.e. the correlation coefficients between today's (t) log of hours and the next day's (t þ 1) log of hours, as well as any other number of days ahead for divers returning to the same statistical area as well as any other area within the same QMA). Table 6 shows that correlation between the log of hours is always significant and positive, but of a substantially lower magnitude. The general impression is that a long day is followed by a long day, and corresponding for a short day. Divers are not exhausted (recovered ) from a long (short) day leading to an impact of the length of the subsequent day, i.e. there is no obvious exhaustion (recovery) effect in the short term.
Informal discussions with divers stress underwater visibility/weather as the most important determinant for creating favourable harvesting conditions, i.e. weather codes are a strong determinant of daily wage rates. To rule out the possibility that changes in weather during the day may affect transitional wages, we give some closer consideration to the reported weather codes. We find that daily weather conditions Notes: a Weather conditions. ** and * denote significant at 5 and 10% levels, respectively. Further analysis has also been conducted to examine the participation decision of divers by regressing the number of diving days by diver within a month on the average monthly wage, but the coefficients are very small (very close to zero) and the overall fit of the model is low. Similarly, regressing the number of elapsed days between dive occasions by diver within a month on wage levels yields very low but significant coefficients. We conclude that wage levels seem to have little effect on the monthly participation decision and the timing of those dive occasions within the month. We also tested for measurement error and diver experience, but found very little effect on the qualitative results (see further Appendix A1 and A2 in Eggert and Kahui (2011) ).
V. Reference-Dependent Preferences
The results of our empirical estimations challenge the neo-classical theory of intertemporal wage elasticities. KR's (2006) Reference-dependent behaviour of paua (abalone) divers in New Zealandpreferences provides an explanation. Their analysis differs from previous explanations of empirical results (such as by Camerer et al., 1997) in that workers are assumed to have both a daily target for income and for the working hours. KR's (2006) additively separable utility function both capture the classical notion of outcome-based utilities, independent of the reference level and the reference-dependent 'gain-loss' utility. The latter captures the predictions of 'Prospect Theory' that individuals are more sensitive to losses than to gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Tversky and Kahneman, 1991) . KR's (2006) theoretical contribution has brought forth a small number of studies investigating its empirical validity and implications (Doran, 2009; Abeler et al., 2011; Crawford and Meng, 2011) . Crawford and Meng (2011) , in particular, build on Farber (2005 Farber ( , 2008 and KR (2006) , and find stopping probabilities to be more strongly influenced by the second target a driver reaches on a given day rather than the first.
Our results add to the small literature and fit into KR's (2006) theory. Analogous to Crawford and Meng's (2011) Fig. 1 , the existence of both an income target and an hours target translates into an expected wage rate w e for each dive occasion. Divers experience exogenous variations in the wage rate determined by underwater visibility, i.e. good underwater visibility conditions and calm water conditions increase the success in finding consecutive patches of paua thereby increasing the wage rate. When diving conditions are adequate and the actual wage w a coincides with the expected wage rate (w a ¼ w e ), divers are able to attain both their income and leisure target. This is indicated by the preference at the point of tangency at a in Fig. 8 , where c t and l t represent the level of consumption of goods and services and of leisure hours, and c r and leisure l r the respective reference consumption level.
On a day where the actual wage rate is above the expected wage rate (w a 4w e ) and starting from the maximum possible level of leisure l max (i.e. zero work hours) a diver will attain his income target before reaching the leisure hours target. A diver may stop close to the first-reached target or continue to work until reaching his second-reached target at a point such as b. Note point b lies slightly below the leisure hours target l r in what Crawford and Meng (2011) define as the income gain/leisure gain domain. Whether divers stop at their first-reached or secondreached target, the result remains the same: divers will 125  750  875  1125  1250  1375  1375  1500  1500  1625  1750  1750  1875  2000  2000  2125  2250  2375  2500  2625  2625  2875  3000  3125  3250  3500  3750  4000 The case of an actual wage below the expected wage rate (w a 5w e ) implies divers reach their leisure hours target before their income target. Divers may stop at their first-reached target as indicated by point e in the figure. If the neoclassical optimal income and hours (solely derived from the consumption utility) are lower than the targets, then stopping at e may lead to a positive-wage elasticity, albeit smaller in magnitude than in a standard neo-classical model. If divers have targets higher than the neo-classical optimal income and hours, they stop at their second-reached target, which increases the likelihood of negative-wage elasticities (Crawford and Meng, 2011) . Doran (2009) found that half of his sample had daily income reference points that increased for an expected permanent wage increase. We have daily data and do not attempt to estimate a full referencedependent model like his or Crawford and Meng's (2011) . Still, could anything be said with respect to divers' potential targets?
We calculate the annual average diver-specific wage to split our sample into 'low wage' and 'high wage' observations to distinguish between the influence of income and leisure hours targets (see Fig. 8 ).
The results of a simple OLS regression with the log of hours as the dependent variable and the log of the point-expectation hours and income targets as explanatory variables are shown in Table 7 . Following Crawford and Meng (2011) we proxy diver's income and hours targets by calculating monthly, diver-specific sample averages up to but not including the observation in question.
The estimated coefficients in Table 7 indicate that daily labour supply decisions across PAU 5A, 5B and 5D are strongly influenced by the leisure hours target, but not by the income target, when wages are lower than expected, leading to a positive wage elasticity. The results are less clear cut for unexpectedly high wages. Both the income and the leisure hours target are significant in PAU 5A, with the latter being higher in magnitude, but only the hours target is significant for PAU 5B and 5D. The results in Table 7 provide some support to the hypothesis that our divers primarily care about their first-reached target for unexpectedly low-wage days, while on unexpected high-wage days mostly the second-reached target matters, i.e. the leisure hours target.
VI. Conclusion
Paua divers in southern New Zealand constitute a group of workers that are free to set their working hours on a daily basis and are exposed to large temporary variations in wage levels. According to neo-classical theory they should work long hours a day when wages are high and short hours a day when wages are low, but our results reject this prediction. In fact, divers have negative wage elasticities for high-wage days, and zero wage elasticities for medium-wage days. We explore factors that may distort behaviour, but find little evidence.
To explain the behaviour of divers we use the reference-dependent theory developed by KR (2006) , which assumes that workers have rational expectations and form endogenous income and hours targets. Our results with nonlinear wage elasticities do not fit into the neo-classical theory, but fit with the insight from KR's theory and the analysis by Crawford and Meng (2011) who found that behaviour was more strongly influenced by the second-reached target on a given day irrespective of whether drivers experienced unanticipated low or high wages. Our results indicate that the first-reached target is the most influential determinant of working hours on low-wage days, while on high-wage days it is mostly the secondreached target, i.e. divers appear to be guided by their leisure hours target primarily. Both outcomes are possible within KR's theory and we note that the Reference-dependent behaviour of paua (abalone) divers in New Zealandresult depends on where the targets stand relative to the optimal solution from the consumption utility alone. Our results add to the small but growing set of studies which indicate that reference-dependent models of KR's type will lead to a more comprehensive understanding of labour supply behaviour.
